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State and local jurisdiction are increasingly relying on risk-based management approaches to allocate 
resources for security and emergency planning. Recognizing the needs of these jurisdictions to identify and 
prepare for potential terrorism risks, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), in 
partnership with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Preparedness Directorate 
(NPD), developed the Terrorism Risk Assessment and Management (TRAM) methodology to help local 
jurisdictions implement a robust continuous risk management capability. The TRAM compares the relative 
risk of acts of terrorism against critical assets owned or operated by organizations and identifies and 
prioritizes enhancements in security, emergency response, and recovery that could be implemented to 
reduce those risks. 
 
1. Origin of TRAM Methodology 
The TRAM Methodology was originally developed, applied, and validated by DHS in conjunction with the 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) in the period following 9/11.  Following the 
attacks on the World Trade Center Towers, PANYNJ recognized the need to implement robust risk-based 
processes to evaluate options for improvements in security, response, and recovery, and to allocate 
resources towards solutions that would provide the greatest return on investment, in the form of risk 
reduction.  Therefore, PANYNJ sought technical assistance from DHS to develop a continuous risk 
management capability for critical infrastructure protection that could be implemented at the working 
jurisdictional level.  In response to the Port Authorities’ needs, DHS/PANYNJ/SAIC developed TRAM.  
Following the successful development of this capability for PANYNJ, DHS recognized a need across a 
multitude of state and local agencies for a similar capability and decided to make the methodology and 
toolset available to other jurisdictions. 
2. Overview of the Continuous Risk Management Process 
Risk management is a process that relies on risk-based metrics to identify hazards that pose a potential loss 
to a jurisdiction and to evaluate and select mitigation strategies to reduce those potential losses.  A robust 
risk management process involves three key elements: continuous risk assessment, historical risk tracking, 
and risk mitigation. 
 
The core of the risk management process is continuous risk assessment.  Accurate prediction of risk, based 
on the likelihood and expected consequence of events, forms the basis for all risk management activities.  
A risk assessment allows jurisdictions to identify those hazards that are most significant to the jurisdiction 
and to prioritize assets for risk mitigation.  Risk assessment should be conducted in a continuous manner.  
As risk drivers change over time as a result of the implementation of new mitigation measures or through 
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Historical risk tracking is a process of looking backwards in time in order to evaluate how effective a 
jurisdiction has been at reducing risk and making effective investments.    By comparing the risk profile of 
the jurisdiction over time, it is possible to see by how much the risk of various events has changed.  It is 
also possible to analyze those changes and to determine what variations occurred in the jurisdiction that 
resulted in a change in the level of risk.  It is possible to analyze specific risk mitigation projects that have 
been implemented and to compare the effectiveness of those investments. 
 
Finally, risk mitigation is the process of looking forward in time to evaluate future risk mitigation 
solutions. This component of the risk management process allows jurisdictions to evaluate potential 
mitigation projects, in the form of physical security, operational security, response, or recovery 
improvements, to measure the risk reduction that would result from the implementation of those projects, 
and to compare the risk reduction to the estimated cost, selecting those projects that would result in the 
greatest return on investment. 
 
The TRAM methodology that emerged from the initial DHS/PANYNJ/SAIC partnership was designed to 
meet all three of these objectives.  First, it implements a structured risk-based analytical process to 
approach analysis. Second, TRAM established processes and metrics for continuous risk tracking.  Finally, 
TRAM can be used to support investment decision making by clearly articulating to decision makers the 
expected ROI of investments.  The final analysis from TRAM communicates and ranks possible security, 
response, and recovery investments in terms risk reduction achieved per dollar invested. 
 
TRAM is provided to local jurisdictions as a software tool that allows organizations to perform risk 
management activities as part of their normal security and emergency management practices.   
 
Reflecting the breakdown of risk management activities, the application of the TRAM methodology is 
divided three distinct component phases.   The first main component, the Comprehensive Risk 
Assessment, involves the application of a framework to evaluate the relative risk of attacks by terrorist 
groups against an organization’s critical assets. This framework is presented in Figure 1, and involves an 
evaluation of Criticality, Threat, Vulnerability, Response & Recovery, and Impact. Scenarios are developed 
and evaluated within this framework to allow comparison of these factors across dissimilar assets with 
varying missions.  
 
Figure 1: The 8 Steps of the TRAM Methodology’s Risk Assessment Process 
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3. Risk Assessment Process Criticality Assessment 
The TRAM Risk Assessment Process begins with a comprehensive Criticality assessment.  Criticality 
describes the overall importance of an asset to the jurisdiction, to the region, and to the nation.  As part of 
the TRAM process, workshops are typically conducted to gather input from representatives of the 
organization regarding the criticality of assets. The first step in this assessment is to develop a 
comprehensive list of assets within the organization.  Assets having similar Threats, Criticalities, 
Vulnerabilities, and Risks and are typically grouped as representative asset types.  After a list of assets has 
been developed, Critical Asset Factors (CAFs) are established.  CAFs represent the goals and mission of the 
organization and are used to quantify the relative importance of assets using a multi-attribute scale.  
Typical CAFs include:  Potential for Casualties, Potential of Business Continuity Loss, Potential National 
Strategic Importance, Potential Economic Impact, Potential Loss of Emergency Response function, 
Potential Replacement Cost, and Potential Environmental Impact. The established CAFs are then 
compared and rated on their relative importance to the organization’s mission.  Ratings are made on a 
scale of one (1) to five (5), with “1” being least important to the overall mission and “5” being of 
maximum importance. 
Once the CAFs are defined and rated, they 
are applied to each asset.  For each CAF, 
an asset applicability rating of zero (0) to 
ten (10) is assigned, indicating the extent 
to which the factor applies to each asset.  
In using this approach, some agreement is 
necessary on what constitutes the “upper-
bound” of each CAF – that is, when assigning a 
rating of 0 to 10, if “0” means the factor does 
not apply to the asset, what does a “10” mean?  Representatives of the jurisdiction must collectively 
develop “upper-bound” criteria for 
each CAF.   
 
Finally, for each asset, each CAF rating 
(1 – 5) is multiplied by the asset 
applicability for that CAF (0 – 10) and 
the results are summed for all factors.  
The resultant total is the Criticality of 
that asset.  This number represents a 
quantified measurement of the total 
potential impact to the organization’s 
mission if that asset were completely 
destroyed.  Once asset criticality 
ratings are obtained by the 
organization, the asset list is sorted in 
descending order with the highest 
ratings (most critical assets) at the top of the list. This provides the jurisdiction a clear direction on the 
assets that require attention when considering Risk. Figure 3 displays sample criticality results.   
4. Risk Assessment Process Threat Assessment 
The TRAM risk assessment is scenario based.  To define an applicable set of scenarios for the risk 
assessment, each scenario is broken into the asset to be attacked and threat of attack on each asset. Threat 
describes the likelihood of a specific type of event occurring or being directed at a specific asset. The 
Threat Assessment component of the TRAM methodology is used to identify possible attacks against 
assets previously determined through the Criticality Assessment and to quantify the plausibility and 





















































CAF Value --> 5 5 3 2 2 2 190
Asset Name Total
1 Asset A 10 4 0 2 6 10 106
2 Asset B 10 4 0 2 6 5 96
3 Asset C 1 10 1 1 1 10 82
4 Asset D 1 10 1 1 1 10 82
5 Asset E 4 8 2 1 1 6 82
#
Figure 3: Sample criticality results. 
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severity of those attacks.  The end result of the Threat Assessment is the development of a Threat Rating 
for each attack scenario devised for the critical assets.   
 
In basic terms, Threat can be broken down into two components:  the Capability of a terrorist to execute 
and attack, and the Intent of that terrorist.  “Capability” captures the general likelihood that a terrorist 
organization would execute a given attack based on the complexity of obtaining a weapon and executing 
the attack.  “Intent” describes the likelihood that a terrorist organization would execute a given attack 
against a specific asset based on the asset’s 
target attractiveness and level of deterrence.  
The process for calculating threat is described 
in Figure 4. 
 
To determine a terrorist’s capability for 
executing an attack, a set of potential attack 
types are developed.  The most common 
attacks assessed in the TRAM methodology 
are: Small Conventional Explosive (SCE), 
Large Conventional Explosive (LCE), 
Chemical Weapons, Radiological Weapons, 
and Biological Weapons.  Attack Ratings are 
based on the likelihood that a terrorist 
possesses the capability to carry out an attack 
and is prepared to use that capability against 
the organization’s assets.  
 
Attack Likelihood Ratings represent the capability of adversaries and are developed for each Attack Type 
by a group of threat experts and organizational representatives with specific local knowledge.  For each 
Attack Type, the likelihood of use is rated on a relative scale from highly unlikely (0) to highly likely 
(10).  It is important to note that the Attack Likelihood rating does not measure the likelihood of an 
attack against a specific target, but rather measures the general likelihood that such an attack could occur 
somewhere within the jurisdiction or organization.  To evaluate the likelihood of an attack on a specific 
target the intent on the adversaries must also be 
evaluated. 
 
The first step in determining intent is to evaluate the 
Target Attractiveness of each asset from a terrorist’s 
perspective based on two drivers: Target Value and 
Deterrence. Target Value represents the goals of the 
terrorist in attacking a target, and is rated on a scale 
of 0-10.  Deterrence takes into account the features 
of an asset that would make that asset less attractive 
as a target for a terrorist and is also rated on a 0-10 
scale.   A low Deterrence rating (0) indicates that the 
asset is not attractive, or that the perception of the 
adversary is that offensive action would be futile.  A 
high Deterrence rating (10) indicates that 
the asset is attractive as a target, or indicates 
that the perception of the adversary is that 
success of the attack is certain.   
 
Scenario Likelihood measures the relative 
likelihood that a specific scenario would be 
carried out against a particular target and is a 
function of Target Attractiveness and an 





1 Asset A LCE land 6 41.2 247.5
2 Asset A LCE water 5 41.2 206.2
3 Asset A SCE land 10 80.0 800.1
4 Asset A LCE land 6 49.4 296.6
5 Asset A LCE water 5 49.4 247.1
6 Asset A SCE Land 10 86.7 866.9
7 Asset B LCE water 5 18.4 92.2
8 Asset C LCE water 5 18.4 92.2
9 Asset C LCE land 6 78.9 473.1
10 Asset C LCE water 5 78.9 394.3
11 Asset C SCE land 10 97.8 978.2
12 Asset C CHEM Bldg 2 44.4 88.8
13 Asset D LCE land 6 41.6 249.5
14 Asset D LCE water 5 41.6 207.9
15 Asset D SCE land 10 80.3 803.3
Figure 4: TRAM process for determining Threat. 
Figure 5: Attack Elasticity is used to determine scenario 
likelihood, based on the attractiveness of the target, and the 
type of weapon used in the attack. 
Figure 6: Sample Threat calculations. 
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Attack Elasticity parameter.  The Scenario Likelihood rating reflects the intentions of the terrorist with 
regard to the type of attack under consideration.  For simple Attack Types or for weapons that are easier 
to obtain, a relatively low Target Attractiveness might be acceptable to the terrorist.  For a more complex 
attack or for weapons that are more difficult to obtain and/or deliver, terrorists would likely demand a 
greater level of Target Attractiveness.  Figure 5 shows the relationship between Scenario Likelihood and 
Target Attractiveness for different attack types.  The rate at which the Scenario Likelihood decreases, in 
relation to the Target Attractiveness, is dependent on the shape of the curve for each Attack Type.  The 
shape is defined by the Attack Elasticity parameter.  The Attack Elasticity parameter is a measure of the 
sensitivity of the Attack Likelihood to the Target Attractiveness of that particular asset.  The rating 
specifies the horizontal position of the scenario likelihood curve. Once Attack Elasticity values for 
different attack types are established, the Scenario Likelihood values for each scenario can be determined. 






Once intent and capability have been determined, the next step in the Threat Assessment is to select a set 
of plausible attack scenarios for each asset.  Each selected attack scenario consists of a specific Attack 
Type being applied against a specific asset.  Scenarios are selected based on the Scenario Likelihood rating 
and the plausibility of a particular Attack Type (e.g., scenarios using chemical or biological agents to attack 
an open air structure such as a bridge are disregarded).  Other criteria used to develop scenarios include: High 
Scenario Likelihood, High perceived Vulnerability, High Criticality, and specific threats to asset, History of 
attacks on assets of similar type or function.  Figure 6 displays sample threat calculations and shows that 
the Threat Rating is the product of the Attack Likelihood and the Scenario Likelihood.  This Threat 
Rating represents the relative likelihood of a scenario being executed by a terrorist. 
 
5. Risk Assessment Process Vulnerability Assessment 
The third component of the TRAM risk assessment is the Vulnerability Assessment.  The purpose of the 
Vulnerability Assessment is to identify the likelihood that each of the attack scenarios selected in the 
Threat Assessment would be successfully executed if attempted.  The objective is to evaluate the 
susceptibility of critical assets to a particular attack scenario.  The output of this process is an overall 
rating of the asset’s vulnerability.  This rating is determined by evaluating security countermeasures that 
are in place to deny accessibility to an attack, evaluating the likelihood an attack would be detected, and 
evaluating the likelihood that a detected attack could be successfully interdicted. The attack scenarios are 
kept general in nature so that they take into consideration all of the potential vulnerabilities at an asset, 
and are not written to specifically exploit one particular vulnerability.  This prevents recommendations 
from being limited to protecting against one particular avenue of attack on an asset.  However, specific 
vulnerabilities are evaluated in the rating process, to ensure that identified needs address these 
vulnerabilities. 
 
During the Threat Assessment, threat experts conduct site visits to assets with high criticality ratings or 
high perceived vulnerabilities.  During these visits, participants use a checklist of security countermeasures 
to determine what types of countermeasures are present at each asset.  Certain countermeasure types are 
specific to an asset while other countermeasures function across a jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction-wide 
countermeasures are applied to every asset during the Vulnerability Assessment.   Built into these checklists 
is a class system to rate each security countermeasure.  The class system includes specific descriptions and 
guidelines of the capabilities that are represented by each class of security.  Class ratings start at “0” which 
represents no capability in that area.  Higher class ratings indicate increasing levels of capability and 
security.  The Threat Experts uses these checklists to specify which countermeasures are present at each 
asset.   Table 7 is an example of the class guidelines used for fencing systems.   
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The specifics of each scenario and the types of countermeasures present are used to evaluate the likelihood 
that the scenario would be successfully executed.  This is accomplished by determining the likelihood of 
three vulnerability factors:  
 
• Access Control (L1) What is the likelihood that access will be denied? 
• Detection Capabilities (L2) What is the likelihood that the attack would be detected either while 
access is being attempted or after access is gained? 
• Interdiction Capabilities (L3) If detected, what is the likelihood the attack will be interdicted? 
 
The TRAM tool contains a set of rating guidelines that allow analysts to produce LSA ratings for the three 
likelihood factors, based on the attack type and on the classes of security countermeasures that are present 
at the asset.  These guidelines, which were developed by security and threat experts, facilitate the 
assessment process and provide for consistency in ratings between assets and assessments.  However, all 
ratings are still evaluated by threat experts to ensure that the tool calculated guideline ratings are applicable 
to each particular asset and scenario.   
 
The three likelihood ratings are used in an event tree process to produce the overall LSA for each attack 
scenario.  Figure 8 illustrates an example decision tree analysis.  It is assumed that an attack will be 
successful if not detected, or if detected and not interdicted.  This avoids immeasurable and/or unpredictable 
externalities such as weather, faulty weapons, or attacker incompetence. 
 
Table 7: Sample Evaluation Criteria used by Threat experts. 
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Figure 8: Event tree analysis example. 
The process of evaluating the three vulnerability factors involves rating the likelihood of each on a range 
from 0.0 (POOR: highly vulnerable) to 1.0 (EXCELLENT: highly secure).  In this example, if each of the 
three factors were rated at a likelihood of 0.5, it would indicate that one-half of all attacks would gain 
access to the target, one-half of those that gained access would be detected, and one-half of the attacks that 
are detected would be interdicted before they were successfully executed.  The event tree uses these 
likelihoods to determine the total percentage of attacks that would be successful.  This final value is the 
LSA rating, which represents the likelihood that particular attack scenario would be successfully carried out. 
Figure 9 shows an example set of vulnerability results. 
# Asset Attack Type L1 L2 L3 LSA
1 Asset A LCE 0.00 0.32 0.12 0.96
2 Asset A LCE water 0.00 0.14 0.10 0.99
3 Asset A SCE Bldg 0.05 0.49 0.18 0.86
4 Asset A SCE scuba 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.99
5 Asset A BIO Bldg 0.05 0.32 0.14 0.91
6 Asset A CHEM Bldg 0.05 0.46 0.14 0.89
7 Asset B LCE water 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.98
8 Asset C SCE Bldg 0.03 0.49 0.17 0.89
9 Asset C SCE scuba 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.99
10 Asset C BIO Bldg 0.03 0.33 0.12 0.94
11 Asset C CHEM Bldg 0.03 0.46 0.12 0.92
12 Asset D LCE water 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.99
13 Asset D SCE Bldg 0.00 0.35 0.17 0.94
14 Asset D BIO Bldg 0.00 0.20 0.12 0.97
15 Asset D CHEM Bldg 0.00 0.32 0.12 0.96  
Figure 9: Example of LSA ratings. 
 
Introduction to the Terrorism Risk Assessment and Management (TRAM) Methodology  Page 8 
 
6. Risk Assessment Process Response & Recovery Capabilities Assessment 
The fourth component of the TRAM risk assessment involves an evaluation of the jurisdiction’s ability to 
respond to and recover from terrorist attacks.  This assessment is unique in that it does not consider 
preventative measures against terrorist acts, but rather looks strictly at the organization’s ability to 
respond to and recover from an attack that has occurred. 
 
The Response Assessment provides the jurisdiction and local emergency response agencies a “self-
assessment” tool to identify capabilities, gaps and shortfalls across functional areas, to include: Staffing & 
Personnel, Training, Equipment & Systems, Planning, Exercise, Evaluation & Corrective Actions, and 
Organization & Leadership.  Within each functional area, capabilities are evaluated against staffing, 
training, equipment & systems, planning & preparedness, evaluation & corrective actions, and against 
organization & leadership.  Each rating is determined as the percentages of “current” response capabilities 
against “desired” response capabilities.  “Current” response capabilities refer to the agency’s present ability 
to respond to a WMD incident, while the “desired” response capabilities refer to the current best practices, 
or industry standards in response capability per local, state or federal standards or guidelines. 
 
The contribution that each functional area makes towards supporting a response to a given attack type 
(e.g., SCE at a transit facility) is weighted based on the expected tasks and roles a functional area would 
perform.  These weighting factors reflect the changing roles and responsibilities of each functional area for 
each Attack Type. The weights for each Attack Type are applied to each functional area and sum to 1.0 so 
that an overall weighted average can be calculated.  The overall weighted average for each Attack Type 
represents the jurisdiction’s preparedness for that specific attack.  Figure 10 displays the results of the 
response assessment rating and the functional area weighted factors.  
 
The Recovery Assessment reviews agency functions and capabilities, in an effort to manage recovery 
elements and business continuity following a terrorist attack to include: Plans & Procedures, Alternate 
Facilities, Operational Capacity, Communications, Vital Records & Databases, Tests, Training and 
Exercises. Figure 10 also displays a set of recovery results. 
 
 
Figure 10: Example RRCA Ratings 
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7. Risk Assessment Process Impact Assessment 
The fifth component of the TRAM Risk Assessment Methodology – Impact Assessment – estimates the 
level of destruction to critical assets attacked using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD).  Given the range 
of WMD types – from small explosives to biological weapons – a successful attack might not result in the 
total destruction of a critical asset.  In addition, the capability within an organization to respond to and 
recover from an attack will affect overall impact.  The Impact Assessment calculates the damage to a 
critical asset from a specific attack scenario and includes the mitigation effect of response and recovery.   
 
The Criticality ratings for each asset form the basis for calculating Impact ratings for each attack scenario 
(see Figure 11).  While the Criticality rating represents the asset’s total contribution to the organization’s 
mission, the Impact rating represents that portion of the asset’s criticality that is lost as a result of the 
attack scenario given the particular attack type and delivery method.  This rating is based on a scale of 0.0 
- 1.0, with 0.0 representing no impact and 1.0 representing the complete destruction of the asset.  It is 
important to note this rating is made relative to the level of criticality previously determined, not to a set 
value.  Therefore, impact values alone are not comparable across assets.  The ratings calculated in the 
Impact Assessment represent how effective each scenario is in evaluating an asset’s contribution to the 
CAF.  For example, assume the target is a transit station with peak occupancy of 100 employees.  If an 
attack scenario predicts 30 fatalities or serious casualties, then the Impact rating for CAF, “Potential 
Casualties,” is 30 out of a possible 100, or 0.3. 
 
As with the vulnerability ratings, the TRAM 
tool contains guideline impact ratings.  These 
ratings are produced automatically by the tool 
for given scenario and asset types.  The 
guidelines help ensure consistency across 
scenarios and assessments.   As with all 
guideline ratings, the impact ratings produced 
by the tool are checked by experts to ensure 
that they are applicable to the specific asset 
under consideration. 
 
Impact ratings are used, in conjunction with 
response and recovery ratings, to determine a Consequence rating for each CAF.  The Consequence rating 
represents the actual level of loss for that CAF in that particular scenario.  Consequence ratings are 
comparable between assets. For each scenario, an overall Consequence rating is calculated by summing the 
Consequence for each CAF.  This overall Consequence rating indicates the full result of the attack scenario. 
 
8. Risk Results 
After the five assessments (Criticality, Threat, Vulnerability, Response Capabilities, and Impact) in the 
TRAM methodology are completed a risk profile can be developed for the jurisdiction.   This profile is a 
set of scenario risk results that are plotted on a relative risk diagram.  The relative risk diagram displays a 
visual representation of relative risk of the different attack scenarios.  Risk is composed of two primary 
components:  Likelihood and Consequence.  The Likelihood rating represents the overall likelihood that an 
attack scenario would occur (Threat) and be executed successfully (LSA).  The Likelihood for a scenario is 
calculated as the product of the ratings determined in the Threat and Vulnerability components of the 
TRAM.  The Consequence rating reflects the overall expected loss of the scenario. 
 
To facilitate plotting and comparison of scenario results, the Likelihood and Consequence ratings are 
normalized.  The Likelihood value is normalized on a scale of 0.0 – 1.0.  Each Likelihood rating is divided 
by (1000), the maximum actual value of the product of the Scenario Likelihood (100) and Attack Rating 
(10). Consequence is normalized on a scale of 0 to 100 by dividing the Consequence value for a scenario by 
the greatest actual Criticality value (X), and multiplying by 100. 
Figure 11: Consequence calculations. 
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Figure 12: Overview of Relative Risk diagram 
 
The Consequence rating, which represents the impact of a successful attack on the region, and the nation, 
is represented on the horizontal X-Axis and the Likelihood rating, which represents the likelihood of a 
successful attack occurring, is represented on the vertical Y-Axis.  The relative risk diagram seen in Figure 
12 shows an example of all representative scenario risk results. 
 
The relative risk diagram is an extremely valuable tool for evaluation of the relative risk between various 
assets and scenarios.  This diagram visually indicates which assets and scenarios carry risks that require 
mitigation.    In addition the diagram can be used as a risk communication tool to explain the current risk 
faced by the jurisdiction. 
 
9. Historical Risk Tracking 
The second major component of the risk management process is historical risk tracking.   Risk tracking is 
a process of looking backwards in time in order to evaluate how effective a jurisdiction has been at reducing 
risk and making effective investments.     
 
The relative risk diagram serves as the heart of the risk tracking process.  By comparing how the risk 
profile of the jurisdiction varies at different points in time, it is possible to see too what degree the risk of 
various events has changed.  TRAM has the capability to load and compare any number of risk profiles for 
a jurisdiction.   Figure 13 shows how changes in risk over time are displayed in TRAM. Evaluating changes 
in the risk of the set of scenarios over time shows how the overall risk profile of the jurisdiction has 
changed.  Improvements in security, response, and recovery will generally result in an overall reduction of 
risk to the jurisdiction. 
 
Changes in the risk profile over time can also reflect changes in the threat environment to the jurisdiction.  
As the threat of certain attack types changes, the position of scenarios on the risk diagram will move 
accordingly.  Similarly, changes to the criticality of assets will also result in a change in risk and a shift of 
relevant scenarios on the relative risk diagram. 
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An important part of risk tracking is the ability 
to evaluate the effective of particular risk 
mitigation projects that have been implemented 
between assessments.  TRAM allows users to 
evaluate changes in risk over time to specific 
scenarios and to determine what changes 
occurred in the jurisdiction that resulted in a 
change in the level of risk.   This allows the 
specific risk reduction that was achieved by the 
implementation of each project to be identified.  
Using these results, it is possible to analyze 
specific risk mitigation solutions that have been 
implemented and to compare the effectiveness 
of those investments. 
10. Risk Mitigation 
The final component of continuous risk 
management is the process of risk mitigation.  
Risk mitigation is the process of evaluating 
potential risk reduction solutions and to select 
those solutions for implementation that will 
result in the greatest possible return on 
investment.  
 
TRAM allows users to evaluate the risk reduction that would be provided by various different types of 
projects that might be implemented.  Figure 14 demonstrates how the relative risk diagram might change 
based on various risk mitigation countermeasures.  Improvements in security at specific assets generally 
improve the vulnerability ratings for scenarios at that asset.  Those improvements, in turn, reduce the 
overall likelihood and the risk of those scenarios.  Improvements response and recovery capabilities 
typically will reduce the impact of scenarios across the jurisdiction, reducing the consequence, and therefore 
the risk of those scenarios.  Finally, improvements in site hardening can also reduce consequence and risk, 
but only for those scenarios at which the hardening is applied. 
 
The first step in Risk Mitigation is to identify potential mitigation measures that could be implemented by 
the jurisdiction to reduce risk.   Users identify solutions that could be applicable at each asset or across the 
jurisdiction.  TRAM them evaluates each option alone and in combination with other options, predicting 
the total risk reduction that is afforded by each combination.  Within TRAM each combination of options 
is applied to the baseline risk assessment and a new risk profile is produced, reflecting the risk profile of the 
jurisdiction, if that combination of projects were implemented.  The difference between the new risk 
profile and the original baseline risk is then calculated.  That difference represents the total risk reduction 





Figure 13: Example of TRAM's ability to track risk over time. 
 
Introduction to the Terrorism Risk Assessment and Management (TRAM) Methodology  Page 12 
 
Potential solutions are run alone and in combination because projects are often synergistic and/or partially 
redundant.  This reflects the concept that most effective security plans are layered in nature.  Capabilities 
function in an integrated manner to provide protection at the asset.  The evaluation within TRAM reflects 
these interactions and often the risk reduction provided by combination of projects will be markedly 
different than the sum of the projects, if applied alone. 
 
A series of cost calculations are executed to identify the total expected lifecycle costs for the risk 
mitigation measures.  During site visits and in subsequent internal meetings, analysts estimate the required 
units (i.e., linear feet of fencing or number of patrols) for each recommended countermeasure at each site.  
Total implementation and annual recurring costs for each are calculated based on the required units and per 
unit costs.  The final net present cost (NPC) for each countermeasure recommendation is an initial best 
estimate, based on national average costs, intended to allow relative comparison between potential 
solutions.  Actual implementation costs could vary significantly based on geography and site specific 
conditions, however the relative cost between projects is generally accurate.  As potential projects are 
identified for possible implementation, cost estimates should be refined. 
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Figure 15: Example of a CBA analysis for one asset.   
The evaluation of identified needs is conducted in the TRAM process using a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
technique to prioritize mitigation measures by Return on Investment (ROI).  The CBA is a quantitative 
process which computes system-wide risk reduction benefit and lifecycle cost for various risk mitigation 
measures that could be employed by the organization. Based on the risk reduction and lifecycle cost for all 
risk reduction options, TRAM can produce CBA plots that allow for comparison of total risk reduction and 
cost for all recommended countermeasures and groups of countermeasures 
 
Figure 15 illustrates a plot of CBA results for an individual asset. Each evaluated mitigation option, and 
possible combinations of those options, is plotted on the diagram.  The risk reduction benefit of each 
solution is represented by the horizontal coordinate of each solution. The lifecycle cost is represented by 
the vertical position.  Solutions that are closest to the lower right corner of the diagram offer the greatest 
return on investment (i.e. the greatest risk reduction for the lowest cost). 
 
Generally, on the risk diagram, it is possible to identify a “horizon” of solutions.  The horizon is defined by 
those solutions which provide the greatest possible level of risk reduction for any given cost.  The dashed 
line on Figure 15 indicates those solutions that make up the horizon.  Typically, the nature of the solutions 
that make up the horizon is that greater levels of risk reduction becoming increasingly more expensive to 
obtain.   A certain level of risk reduction can usually be obtained relatively inexpensively.  These solutions 
are the “low hanging fruit”.  As the risk is driven out of the system, it then becomes increasingly more 
difficult and expensive to remove additional risk. 
The marginal return on investment between each solution set can be determined by the slope of a line 
between the two points.  The horizontal length of this line is the difference in risk reduction between the 
two projects.  The vertical length is the difference in lifecycle cost between the two projects.  The 
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marginal cost per unit of risk reduction for each countermeasure set therefore is calculated as the difference 
in lifecycle cost divided by the difference in risk. This value represents how much must be spent to 
purchase each additional unit of risk reduction.  Countermeasure sets with the lowest cost per unit of risk 
reduction in a given group of options therefore represent the maximum ROI that can be achieved. Decision 
makers can use the cost benefit diagram to evaluate the benefits that would be available from additional 
investments and to select solution sets that provide reasonable returns.  
 
It is important to note that both the calculated risk reduction and estimated costs for any countermeasure 
set are rough estimates.  Their results should be used to identify projects as candidate for implementation.  
Additional analysis is usually required to better define the potential projects and to refine costs.  To 
identify potential projects, it will be important to consider not only those countermeasure sets that form 
the horizon, but also those that are close to those sets on the diagram.  Because of the rough nature of the 
cost-benefit estimates, it is entirely possible that other similar countermeasure sets could provide similar 
ROI.  
 
11. Future Enhancements of TRAM 
The TRAM compares the relative risk of acts of terrorism against critical assets within a jurisdiction and 
identifies and prioritizes enhancements in security, emergency response and recovery that organizations 
can implement to reduce those risks.  While TRAM has historically been deployed within jurisdictions to 
determine the risk of a terrorist attack, the Risk methodology is extendible to other (non-terrorism) 
hazards, including human-initiated Hazards (e.g., Theft, Sabotage, and Vandalism); Failure Hazards (e.g., 
Structural Failure, Equipment Failure, and Operational Failure) and Natural Hazards (e.g., Hurricane, 
Earthquake, and Blizzard).  TRAM is currently being enhanced to permit a comparison of relative risk 
across all hazards – terrorist and non-terrorist and will allows for the assessment of total risk reduction 
benefits for proposed solutions.   
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Convergence of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Continuity of Operations in 
Banking and Finance: A Network Modeling Framework for Holistic Risk Management in 






The Federal Reserve Bank’s Fedwire Funds Service (Fedwire) is a network of 
financial services sector participants that provides the foundation for the US economy 
and the backbone of the US Banking and Finance critical infrastructure sector. Banks 
exchange in excess of $500 trillion per year over Fedwire, and coordinate payments with 
one another that both significantly increase the efficiency of the US economy while 
drastically reducing the intrinsic resiliency of the financial services. Recent advances in 
network science, along with a conceptual convergence taking place between critical 
infrastructure protection and business continuity strategies, have made it possible to 
develop and implement holistic security policies that strengthen the operational resiliency 
of the US economy. We highlight this convergence, with a forward-looking approach to 
realizing effective strategies for multiple critical sectors and reaching consensus on 
fundamental tools and metrics in the practice and science of critical infrastructure 
protection.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The central banking system of the United States (The Federal Reserve Bank, or 
FRB) is the keystone of the US banking and finance critical infrastructure sector. The 
Federal Reserve Bank oversees the exchange of roughly 2 trillion dollars a day between 
US banks and other financial sector participants. Participants send and receive money 
through The Federal Reserve Bank’s Fedwire Funds Service (Fedwire) that allows banks 
to electronically transfer funds to one another throughout the business day. 
 Fedwire is the “Real Time Gross Settlement” (RTGS) system that provides the 
backbone of the US financial system1, and allows for the near immediate and legally 
binding transfer of money from one financial services sector participant to another2. 
Payment instructions are sent over an information/telecom system to the central bank 
which holds information about the account balances of participants. When an instruction 
is received, FRB debits and credits the appropriate accounts to complete a transaction. 
For example, if Bank A needs to pay Bank B $100,000, Bank A will send a payment 
message to FRB instructing the central bank to credit Bank A’s account $100,000 and 
debit Bank B’s account $100,000 (Figure 1). Averages of well over 500,000 payments 
between roughly 5,000 different banks are processed in this way every business day3. In 
2005, Fedwire processed over $518 trillion with an average transaction value of $3.9 
million4. 
One enormous benefit of processing transactions though RTGS systems like 
Fedwire is that banks do not have to keep large reserves of cash in their transaction 
accounts. Banks maintain only the amount necessary to fulfill their transactions 
throughout the day and keep this amount especially low by timing incoming and outgoing 
payments. That is, if Bank A needs to pay Bank B $100,000, it will wait until its FRB 
account has been debited by the incoming payment from Bank C, which will wait for 
payments from other banks in the Fedwire network (Figure 2). It has been demonstrated 
that this timing of incoming and outgoing payments plays a major role in the US 
economy, allowing banks to minimize the risks associated with giving credit to other 
financial sector participants, and that payment coordination is severely disrupted by 
events affecting the critical infrastructure systems underlying the financial services5, 6. 
                                                
1 Other large RTGS systems include the Clearing House Automated Payment System (CHAPS) in the UK, 
the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) in Canada, and the Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross 
Settlement Express Transfer System (TARGET) of the European Union.  
2 i.e., final and irrevocable settlement. 
3 Kimmo Soramäki, Morten L. Bech, Jeffery Arnold, Robert J. Glass, Walter E. Beyeler, “The Topology of 
Interbank Payment Flows,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 243, March 2006, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr243.pdf, accessed 10 March 2008. This report was also 
published as: Kimmo Soramäki, Morten L. Bech, Jeffrey Arnold, Robert J. Glass, and Walter E. Beyeler, 
"The Topology of Interbank Payment Flows," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications 379, 
no. 1 (June 2007): 317-33. 
4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Banking and Finance: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
Sector-Specific Plan as Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan,” May 2007, 
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-banking.pdf, accessed 10 March 2008.  
5 James McAndrews and Samira Rajan, “The Timing and Funding of Fedwire Funds Transfers,” Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Policy Review,Volume 6, Number 2, July 2000 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/00v06n2/0007mcan.pdf   
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Figure 1: Transfer of $100,000 from Bank A to Bank B using Fedwire. 
 
   
 
 
Figure 2: Bank A waits for a payment from Bank C before paying Bank B. Bank C waits 
for payments from other banks in the network, potentially payments from Bank B. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
6 James J. McAndrews and Simon M. Potter, “Liquidity Effects of the Events of September 11, 2001,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, Volume 8, No. 2, November 2002 
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The US financial system is centered on the highly efficient clearing and 
settlement network provided by Fedwire. The attacks of 9/11, the Northeast blackout of 
2003, and the ongoing “credit crisis” all demonstrate the continuing fragility of this vital 
process. Following 9/11, a great deal of effort was put in to establishing a sound basis for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) in the Financial Services Sector (FSS). Over 7 
years after 9/11/2001 and 6 years after requirements set forth in the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), a comprehensive CIP framework for FFS has yet 
to be implemented. There are still no collectively accepted tools or metrics for achieving 
the level of protection and security required for Fedwire. 
Here we begin to address this gap by tapping in to two areas of literature within 
the security profession: network analytic methods of CIP, and business continuity 
management strategies. Over the past several years, there is growing consensus among 
financial economists and security practitioners about the goals of both areas— provide 
continuity of operations during and after a disaster— but there has been little consensus 
regarding the strategies and tactics needed to reach these goals. A convergent CIP 
framework, such as the one outlined below, can provide CIP practitioners working in FSS 
with universally accepted standards to identify and address the risks posed to the 
networks that support the operations of critical infrastructure sectors, including Fedwire.  
The Fedwire network provides the underpinnings of the US Banking and Finance 
sector, just as other networks provide the basis for other critical infrastructure/key 
resource (CI/KR) sectors7. Well-known examples of CI network models include the 
Power/Energy sector, which models the flow of electricity to and from residential, 
commercial and industrial areas, the Water sector, which models the distribution and 
processing of water resources, and the Transportation sector, which models the flow of 
people and products form one place to another. While a good deal is known about the 
topology and network structure of these other CI/KR sectors, relatively few investigations 
have been made regarding Fedwire’s topology until recently.  
We will examine the Fedwire network, paying close attention to its familiar 
elements, its response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11/2001, and its similarity to other 
critical infrastructures. We address the central question of reaching consensus regarding 
the fundamentals of risk assessment in critical infrastructure protection, and develop the 
idea of conceptual convergence between business continuity management (BCM) and 
CIP, aimed at addressing the operational robustness of US critical infrastructure. We then 
outline a strategic framework based on this convergence, and apply this framework to 
protecting the Fedwire network. 
 
TOPOLOGY OF THE FEDWIRE NETWORK 
 
 We model Fedwire as a network consisting of two types of elements, nodes and 
links, where nodes represent financial services sector participants, and links represent the 
transactions between these participants over the course of a single day (Figure 3). The 
full collection of nodes and links-depicting an entire day’s worth of activity across 
Fedwire- is the network’s topology (Figure 4). The topology of the Fedwire network 
shares many of the features seen in other networked critical infrastructure models. These 
                                                
7 Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation 
(Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2006) 
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features provide insight in to the best ways to protect critical infrastructure from both 
natural and man-made threats, and help CIP practitioners devise strategies for optimal 
resource allocations across and between CI/KR sectors. One of the most instructive of 
these features is the presence of ‘hubs’ in the Fedwire network. These are nodes that have 
a great many more links than most of nodes in the network. Every day, these ‘hub’ banks 
send thousands of outgoing messages and receive thousands of incoming messages. The 
vast majority of banks in the Fedwire network send and receive considerably fewer, with 
almost half sending fewer than five messages per day8. Network hubs are also present in 
other CI/KR sectors, such as power and energy, water distribution, information and 




Figure 3: Node and link depiction of money transfer over Fedwire. There was a 
transaction between Bank A and Bank B during the day. 
 
In addition to the presence of hubs in Fedwire, the network also shares additional 
similar and well-documented topological features with other critical infrastructure 
networks in terms of its connectivity. Fedwire, like networks in the water, power and 
telecom sectors, is simultaneously very ‘compact’ and sparsely connected. It is compact 
in the sense that there exist only a few links separating any two banks in the Fedwire 
network. The vast majority of banks in the Fedwire network are connected to each other 
through only one or two other banks. The nature of this compactness can be seen in 
Figures 4 and 5. In fact, money sent by Bank A, for instance, could end up at any other 
bank in the Fedwire network through an average of fewer than three links (transactions)10. 
Despite this compactness, the Fedwire network is also extremely “sparse”. It uses very 
few links to achieve this high level of connectivity. If every bank in Fedwire were 
connected by a link, there would be over 25 million links in the network. By contrast, the 
actual number of daily links in Fedwire averages around 76,000, or about 0.3% of the 
total possible links.  
This combination of compactness and sparse link topology means that it’s quite 
easy for money to move around the network using few interconnections11. The route that 
money takes from one bank to another is called it’s “path” in the network, and the 
number of banks it goes through to get from one FSS participant to another is called the 
path length. The fact that each Bank in Fedwire is very closely connected to almost every 
other bank means that the average path length in the Fedwire network is very small. In 
addition to network hubs, short average path length is a common feature of many CI 
networks that have been studied over the past few years12. Investigating these paths plays 
a vital role in the CIP strategies we develop for the Banking and Finance sector. 
                                                
8 Soramäki et al., “Topology of Interbank Payment Flows”. 
9 For a full review, see Lewis, “Critical Infrastructure Protection”.  
10 Soramäki et al., “Topology of Interbank Payment Flows”. 
11 In the network science literature, this is commonly referred to as “The Small World Effect”.  
12 For a review of complex networks, see M.E.J. Newman, “The Structure and Function of Complex 
Networks,” SIAM Review, 45 (2003): 167-256.  
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Figure 4: The full collection of nodes and links depicts a day’s worth of Fedwire 
transactions. The above 20 banks provide a fractional representation of the approximately 
500,000 daily transactions across Fedwire.   
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a. b.  
c. d.  
e. f.  
 
Figure 5: Cascading failures across the  Fedwire network. Problem starting at Bank A, 
primary effects (a), secondary effects (b), tertiary effects (c), and quaternary effects (d), 
entire network shown in Figure 4. A Problem at Bank A would reach the entire network 
in just 5 steps (e), as would, for example, a problem originating at Bank K (f).  
 
EFFECTS OF 9/11/2001 ON THE FEDWIRE NETWORK 
 
 The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were aimed at, among other things, destroying and 
disrupting the United States financial system and economic infrastructure. The attacks 
effected Fedwire operations in two ways. Firstly and most saliently, physical buildings 
and communication infrastructure was destroyed, effectively removing nodes and links 
from the Fedwire network. Destruction of a bank is analogous to removing a node from 
the Fedwire network—payments can no longer be received or sent—, thus the overall 
size of the network was reduced during the aftermath of 9/11. The destruction of physical 
infrastructure alone does not explain the effects of 9/11 on the US economy or Fedwire, 
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and CIP methods aimed at protecting physical infrastructure will likewise be ineffective 
at addressing the problems.  
Directly following the attacks, only about 6% of the Fedwire network was 
removed13. More devastating to the US economy was the ripple or cascade effect that the 
removal of this 6% had on the Fedwire network. Since banks rely on the incoming 
payments of other participants to complete transactions, the 6% of banks that were 
effectively removed from the network had a much larger than 6% impact on the US 
financial services sector. The inter-bank coordination of payments that is an intrinsic part 
of the US economy was thrown off. Large value payments became stalled, sometimes for 
days. In many cases lost, destroyed or inaccessible records meant that payments could not 
be made at all14, 15.   
 Since the timing and coordination of payments is a near-universal practice among 
large FSS participants16, we can deduce that the initial removed of 6% of the network’s 
nodes had an immediate effect on all of those participants’ neighbor nodes (i.e., those 
banks that were expecting to complete transactions with a removed bank). The secondary 
and tertiary effects of node and link removal will continue to spread through the network 
until either the network is reconnected, or an outside force steps in. This is exactly what 
the FRB did in the wake of 9/11, providing cheap loans to FSS participants to cover the 
balances they expected to receive. While effective in the short term, the emergency 
actions of the FRB are an extremely expensive remedy to the problems caused by lapses 
in interconnectedness17.  
 
CONVERGENCE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTRE PROTECTION AND 
BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT 
 
“The events of September 11 underscored the fact that the financial 
system operates as a network of interrelated markets and participants. The 
ability of an individual participant to function can have wide-ranging 
effects beyond its immediate counterparties. Because of the 
interdependent nature of the U.S. financial markets, all financial firms 
have a role in improving the overall resilience of the financial system.” 
-Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the 
U.S. Financial System18 
 
Following 9/11, there were two main security objectives within Banking and 
Finance: 1) to provide critical infrastructure protection for the US Banking and Finance 
infrastructure, and 2) to provide business continuity management for the US financial and 
                                                
13 Soramäki et al., “Topology of Interbank Payment Flows”. 
14 Morten L. Bech and Rod Garratt, “Illiquidity in the Interbank Payment System following Wide-Scale 
Disruptions”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 239, March 2006, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr239.pdf, accessed 10 March 2008. 
15 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Banking and Finance”.  
16 McAndrews and Potter, “Liquidity Effects”.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, “Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of 
the U.S. Financial System.” 18 April 2003 www.dallasfed.org/banking/notices/2003/not0321.pdf accessed 
8 March 2008.  
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economic system. Business continuity management (BCM) is fundamentally concerned 
with the operational capabilities of whole systems. Effective BCM specifically looks at 
interconnectivity with the goal of keeping an organization operational at the highest 
possible capacity during times of crisis and change, and responding to unforeseen events 
with coordinated, well-planned and efficient methods. 
The number one security goal of the Banking and Finance sector as outlined in its 
Sector-Specific Plan (SSP) is “to maintain its strong position of resilience, risk 
management, and redundant systems in the face of a myriad of intentional, unintentional, 
manmade, and natural threats”19. It then goes on to state that “the products offered by the 
Banking and Finance Sector are largely intangible. Thus, efforts to identify assets are 
largely focused on critical processes rather than physical assets”20. This coincides closely 
with the analyses and strategy set forth by the Federal Reserve21 and other FSS 
publications regarding sector business continuity22.  
 The above analysis illustrates that the vast majority of disruptions to the US 
financial services sector and the US economy are caused not by the destruction of any 
physical infrastructure per se, but by the effects that this destruction has on the 
interconnectedness of FSS participants. One reason why it has been difficult to reach a 
consensus on the underlying fundamentals of risk assessment in CIP is that physical 
infrastructures are valued differently depending on how one interprets criticality in a 
CI/KR sector. Likewise, various physical infrastructures are assessed differently in terms 
of their vulnerabilities and the impact that their removal or reduced operational capacity 
would have on the CI sector following an incident. 
While CIP strategies are often aimed at analyzing and protecting those elements 
of a sector that appear to be most valuable to its overall operation, continuity of 
operations (COOP) at the network level itself is rarely, if at all, considered. In FSS, for 
instance, attention will be paid as to how to best protect “important” banks, but not to 
protecting the underlying network that all banks use to support the US economy23. Just as 
there is consensus regarding the COOP goals of FFS, there is a general consensus that our 
CI elements (network nodes) are interconnected, but little attention is paid to the 
interconnectedness itself.  
 For instance, it is easy to think of Fedwire as a collection of banks sending 
payments to one another and then investigate the network to “pick out” which banks are 
sending the most payments, or which banks are sending the highest valued payments, and 
subsequently dedicate resources to protecting these banks. These traditional CIP methods 
are generally reductionist in design and execution—decisions are made at the level of 
individual components. We choose whether to protect Bank A over Bank B, and how to 
protect the bank itself. It is also “isolationist” in terms of participants, since Bank A is 
                                                
19 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Banking and Finance,” 2. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, “Interagency Paper”.  
22 Such as, U.S. Department of The Treasury, “Improving Business Continuity in the Financial Services 
Sector,” December 2004 www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/chicagofirst_handbook.pdf accessed 9 
March 2008.  
23 Huberto M. Ennis and H.S. Malek, “Bank Risk Failure and the Too-Big-to-Fail Policy,” (Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond) Economic Quarterly Volume 91/2, Spring 2005 
http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/economic_research/economic_quarterly/pdfs/spring2005/ennism
alek.pdf accessed 12 March 2008.  
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generally concerned with reducing its own vulnerability and not concerned with Bank B’s 
vulnerability. In general, a business will only engage in protective measures when they 
enhance its individual competitiveness, and won’t engage in protective measures for the 
purpose of enhancing the resiliency of the CI sector. Traditional methods produce a CI 
network that is only as strong as its weakest (or least concerned) element.    
 Traditional metrics and tools generally lead to both reductionist and isolationist 
strategies, and this is likely one major reason for the lack of a cohesive CIP framework 
today. Moreover, even when the effects of interconnectivity are taken in to consideration, 
the resulting policies often become reductionist at the level of implementation. This 
makes sense: it may be less intuitive to think of Fedwire as a single entity, examine CIP 
from that perspective, and implement policies based on this thinking. In traditional 
thinking, each network component is treated as an individual entity; each is treated as 
affecting one another, but acting alone. 
 It’s not enough to conceptualize how parts affect other parts at the expense of 
ignoring the system. It is highly unlikely (arguably impossible) for the CIP community to 
reach consensus regarding risk analysis metrics and tools for CI/KR sectors (let alone a 
national framework) when everyone is looking at parts. Examining the system, 
holistically, enables CIP researchers and practitioners to work with the same data 
regarding threats and vulnerabilities, and reach the same conclusions regarding CI/KR 
risk analysis and protection strategies. Fortunately, there is a pre-existing body of 
knowledge that does enable us to examine continuity of operations for CI/KR sectors 




Traditional CIP focuses largely on protection of physical assets, and BCM focuses 
primarily on keeping processes operational. Although physical infrastructure is often 
necessary to perform operations, the protection of physical infrastructure should not be 
the goal of a COOP plan24. Likewise, the protection of physical buildings (banks) and 
communication lines (fiber optics) constituting the Fedwire network should not be the 
goal of CIP strategies for the financial services sector.  
The conceptual convergence already taking place between CIP and BCM in the 
Banking and Finance community has produced a clear vision: the security goal must be to 
maintain the underlying processes within the financial services such that the functions of 
the sector are resilient to both natural and manmade incidents, and continue to operate at 
a very high level during major crises and wide-scale disasters. Above all, the principles of 
BCM involve fomenting a state of “readiness” within that aims at preventing crises, and 
developing an implementable response plan aimed at mitigating the effects of those crises 
that do occur. 
The preparation- or readiness-oriented goal of a sound BCM plan is to make sure 
that the whole organization works together to minimize, as much as possible, the chance 
that something will go wrong that will require response-oriented activities. Likewise, the 
response-oriented goal of BCM is not to protect any one building or piece of machinery, 
                                                
24 For a thorough discussion of the variety of modern continuity goals, see for instance, The Business 
Continuity Institute’s “Good Practice Guidelines” at http://thebci.org/gpg.htm, or ASIS International’s 
“Business Continuity Guideline” at www.asisonline.org/guidelines/guidelinesbc.pdf  
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but to keep the whole organization working as best as practicable should a crisis occur. A 
central idea of BCM that mirrors CIP strategies of the Federal Reserve25 is that 
responsibility for continuity of operations and maintaining a high level of system-wide 
capability during a crisis is spread across the organization. “Business continuity is 
everybody’s business”, the maxim goes.  
Business continuity managers can do something that CIP practitioners working 
with traditional tools and metrics can not: address the whole system at once. BC 
managers recognize that an organization’s processes work interdependently, and work to 
make these interdependencies decisively clear. As a consequence, nearly all of the 
problems related to reductionism and isolationist that trouble CIP are absent. Network 
science fills in the pieces where traditional BCM leaves off by allowing us to 
conceptualize and protect CI sectors holistically. Over the last decade, developments in 
network science have enabled us to empirically address many long-standing questions 
about how to measure risk and vulnerability and how to best dedicate resources for 
effective BCM and CIP.  
The effectiveness of network science in the development of CIP strategies has 
already been shown for other CI/KR sectors including power, water and telecom26. Here 
we assert that combining this methodology with BCM principles can lead to a 
comprehensive critical infrastructure protection framework for CI networks like Fedwire. 
As supported by the Banking and Finance SPP, and FRB publications regarding business 
continuity, we further assert that the majority of this effort be focused on high level 
clearing and settlement functions within the U.S. economy, and consequently protecting 
the operations of the Fedwire network. 
 
CONVERGENCE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN 
BANKING AND FINANCE 
 
“To continue to improve the resilience and availability of financial 
services, the Bank and Finance Sector will work through its public-private 
partnership to address the evolving nature of threats and the risks posed by 
the sector’s dependency upon other critical sectors” 
-“Vision Statement” from the Banking and Finance Sector-Specific Plan27 
 
“The resilience of the U.S. financial system in the event of a wide-scale 
disruption rests on the rapid recovery and resumption of the clearing and 
settlement activities that support critical financial markets.” 
- Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the 
U.S. Financial System28 
 
Applying a convergent framework requires that we understand the underlying 
processes and operations of a CI sector. Once we identify three things about the sector, 
                                                
25 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, “Interagency Paper”.  
26 Lewis, “Critical Infrastructure Protection”.  
27 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Banking and Finance,” 2 
28 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, “Interagency Paper”.  
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we can develop strategies and implement policy using universally accepted definitions. 
We must identify:  
 
1) The operational level of the CI sector,  
2) The underlying network of the operational level, and  
3) The risks posed to the underlying network.  
 
Here we provide examples of identifying the basic operational level and 
underlying network for three CI sectors—Power and Energy, Information/Telecom, and 
Banking and Finance. The crucial difference between a convergent framework and 
traditional CIP frameworks is that the convergent framework considers the complete 
sector from the very beginning. It considers what the sector needs to operate, how the 
sector operates in terms of a network that can be modeled and analyzed, and why the 
sector may stop functioning at full capacity. Once we identify the risks posed to the 
network, we can provide effective CIP for the sector. 
 The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the Banking and Finance 
SSP emphasize the fact that different critical infrastructures work at different levels29, 30. 
The power sector, for instance, provides electricity for information and telecom. With out 
electricity, the information and telecom backbone of the U.S. would cease to function. 
This does not mean, however, that CIP strategies and policies at the information/telecom 
level should be developed and implemented to keep electricity flowing. Likewise, the 
financial services and Fedwire are dependent—in large part—on properly functioning IT. 
This does not mean that Banking and Finance CIP strategies should be focused on 
keeping IT infrastructure up and running. Rather, the operational level of the sector 
should be the focal point of CIP policy for that sector. 
In much the same way that an organization can work out contingency plans if a 
supplier or large customer goes out of business, CI/KR sectors can develop contingency-
like plans regarding their dependencies on other types of infrastructure.  The crux of the 
matter is that IT cannot operate without power, and the financial services cannot operate 
with IT, but there are a myriad of reasons other than CI/KR sector interdependencies that 
a sector might fail. These other reasons are the concentration of a sector-specific CIP plan 
that focuses on the operational level and primary functions of the sector. 
The operational level of a CI/KR sector can be determined by the commodity or 
resource that is distributed by the CI network. Envision CIP networks as “movers” of 
some commodity. The water sector moves water. The transportation sector moves 
vehicles, people and cargo. The power sector moves electricity. The information and 
telecom sector moves information. The Banking and Finance sector, then, is in the 
business of moving money and it is this operation—epitomized and dependent on large-
scale clearing and settlement networks like Fedwire—that must be the focal point of CIP 
strategies at the operational level. 
 As an illustration of operational level and underlying network, the power and 
energy sector is perhaps the easiest to recognize. Its operational level moves electricity to 
people and places through the power grid network. It seems almost self-explanatory, but 
                                                
29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Infrastructure Protection Plan,” 2006 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf accessed 1 March 2008.  
30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Banking and Finance”.  
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it is not without nuance. The water sector plays a major role in power and energy, too, by 
providing the infrastructure underpinning hydropower. Much of the US runs on the 
energy captured in moving water, and roughly 20% of the world’s power comes from 
hydroelectricity31. But the Power and Energy sector is not responsible for keeping the 
water flowing. This is an important distinction to make when developing policy for the 
sector, since convergent strategies should be squarely aimed at keeping electricity 
flowing by addressing risks to the power grid, and developing a contingency-like plan for 
situations where hydroelectricity generation becomes compromised. The CIP effort 
focuses on risks to the underlying network itself (i.e., the power grid), since the operation 
of the water sector is largely outside of the control of power and energy operations32.  
A convergent CIP strategy is similarly easy to apply to the Information and 
Telecom CI sector. The IT/Telecom sector distributes information between people and 
places, so its operational level involves the rapid and accurate transfer of computer data 
and other information (e.g., telephone calls) between appropriate parties. Even though 
this operation may be reliant on electricity provided by the Power/Energy CI sector, 
providing electricity is not the operational goal of the sector. The underlying network is 
composed of the fiber optic lines, (copper) telephone lines, relays with communication 
satellites, routers, switches and other network hardware that link personal computers, 
servers and telephone systems together.  
 The principles of BCM work to keep the information flowing through this CI 
network. A convergent CIP strategy in IT/telecom therefore has both ‘readiness’ and 
‘response’ goals, and focuses on, 1) maintaining an information transfer network that 
intrinsically minimizes the probability that information transfer will be negatively 
impacted by outside events (i.e., the network itself has built-in mechanisms that prevent 
crises), and 2) designing an information transfer network that quickly and effectively 
restores accurate information transfer between appropriate parties during and after a 
disaster (i.e., the network itself has built-in mechanisms that respond to those crises that 
do occur).  
A good deal of attention in the financial services sector has been given to securing 
the underlying IT infrastructure upon which networks like Fedwire operate33. While 
many questions have been raised concerning the best way to achieve this goal, there is 
very little agreement about what to do, or even where to begin. Since Banking and 
Finance works “on top of” IT infrastructure, this may seem and intuitive and easy place 
to start. But the operational goal of Banking and Finance is money transfer, not providing 
IT/Telecom.  
The operational goal of Banking and Finance it to provide a medium for highly 
efficient and highly precise funds transfer through networks like Fedwire. The Banking 
and Finance sector analog to the convergent CIP strategy for IT/Telecom focuses on, 1) 
maintaining a funds transfer network that intrinsically minimizes the probability that 
                                                
31 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, “Renewables: Global Status Report, 2006 
Update” http://www.ren21.net/globalstatusreport/download/RE_GSR_2006_Update.pdf accessed 20 March 
2008.  
32 The result is analogous to each business in a supply-chain network developing its own continuity plan, 
and thus effectively strengthening the resiliency of the entire supply-chain.  
33 United States General Accounting Office, “Critical Infrastructure Protection: Efforts of the Financial 
Services Sector to Address Cyber Threats,” January 2003 www.gao.gov/new.items/d03173.pdf accessed 10 
March 2008.  
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clearing and settlement activities will be negatively impacted by outside events, and 2) 
designing a funds transfer network that quickly and effectively restores clearing and 
settlement activities between appropriate parties during and after a disaster.  
 
PROTECTING THE FEDWIRE NETWORK  
 
 We now turn to the application of a convergent model to protection of the 
Fedwire network, identifying the specific risks to Fedwire, and developing strategies to 
reduce the likelihood that the US economy will be disrupted by natural or manmade 
incidents that impact the critical infrastructures underlying the financial services sector. 
The Interagency Paper on Sound Practices of Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. 
Financial System concentrates on hardening the clearing and settlement functions 
supporting the U.S. economy. The Banking and Finance SSP focuses specifically on the 
Fedwire, the clearing and settlement network of the Federal Reserve Bank.  
Financial economists, business continuity experts and critical infrastructure 
practitioners agree that the operation of Fedwire is fundamental to the strength and 
stability of the United States financial system. Current BCM literature and CIP literature 
in Banking and Finance converge on two other core concepts: 1) the financial services 
sector is essentially the entity that moves money and monetary assets through a network 
of rights holders (FSS participants), and 2) the sector relies on a network of 
interdependent processes to perform this fundamental task. These facts culminate in the 
reality that effective CIP in Banking and Finance must essentially be a process-focused 
enterprise. 
 With this in mind, the goal is relatively straightforward: design and maintain a 
robust underlying network for funds transfer that minimizes the potential for disaster and 
quickly restores activity should one occur. But the precise strategies and policies needed 
to reach these goals can be complex. Accordingly, formulating appropriate strategies 
requires a meaningful understanding of the risks posed to CI sector operations and the 
underlying network.   
 
GRIDLOCK AND DEADLOCK 
 
 Bech and Soramäki outline two major risks to the operation of clearing and 
settlement networks like Fedwire: gridlock and deadlock34, 35. Both of these problems 
arise when money cannot flow through the network as usual (Figure 5a), as was the case 
following the attacks of 9/11 when roughly 6% of banks in the Fedwire were removed 
from the network. A gridlocked network refers to a state where Bank A requires a 
payment form Bank B in order to pay Bank C. That is, Bank A does not have enough 
money on hand to pay Bank B without first receiving payment from Bank C (Figure 5b). 
In a gridlocked network Bank A is waiting on Bank B, Bank B is waiting on Bank C, and 
                                                
34 Morten Linnemann Bech and Kimmo Soramäki, “Liquidity, gridlocks and bank failures in large value 
payment systems,” Emoney 1/29/2002: 113-127 www.soramaki.net/papers/Bech-Soramaki_01_EMR.pdf 
accessed March 9 2008.    
35 Kimmo Soramäki and Morten L. Bech, "Gridlock Resolution in Interbank Payment Systems" Bank of 
Finland Working Papers, no. 9/2001, 13 June 2001 
www.nationalbanken.dk/.../9b01ad8183f05397c1256e7b0040dc54/$FILE/2001_MON4_grid67.pdf 
accessed 10 March 2008.  
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so on. Gridlocks can be resolved when all banks in the payment path have enough money 
in the account balances to settle simultaneously. That is, if the net amount owed to each 
FSS participant was transferred at the same time, no participant end up with an overdraft.  
If this is not the case, the network is deadlocked (Figure 5c), and an outside source (such 
as the Federal Reserve Bank) must provide money for transactions to resume across the 
network.  
 The coordination of payments throughout Fedwire and the low cash reserves that 
banks keep in their accounts enable gridlock to quickly spread throughout the clearing 
and settlement network. Without effective CIP policy in place, this type of cascade will 
rapidly affect the majority of clearing and settlement activity, destabilizing the United 
States financial system and economy, and requiring expensive government intervention 
in the form of liquidity injections by the Federal Reserve36.  
Using the “preparation” and “response” criteria from business continuity 
management, the gridlock and deadlock risks identified by economists and financial 
policy experts, and contemporary critical infrastructure protection theory, effective CIP in 
the Banking and Finance sector means, 1) preparation to prevent gridlocks and deadlocks 
whenever possible, and 2) the ability to quickly and effectively respond to any gridlocks 
or deadlocks that occur.  
Implementation of the convergent framework requires that we model the CI sector 
as a network of nodes and links that moves a commodity, in this case money, from place 
to place. Since gridlocks and deadlocks can be modeled as events taking place on the 
Fedwire network, developments in network theory can guide our strategy. Working with 
network models also allows us to identify risks and vulnerabilities at the network level 
(i.e., for the entire CI/KR sector), and simulate the effects of our strategies during failure 
conditions on the network. In particular, the identification of network hubs and critical 
paths allows us to both prepare for and respond to gridlocks in terms of the system instead 
of individual components.  
 
IDENTIFYING FEDWIRE HUBS 
 
As mentioned above, there are a great many similarities between well-studied CI 
networks, such as water and power, and Fedwire, such as the presence of network hubs 
and short average path lengths. Consequently, we can look to the strategy and policy 
pertinent to other CI sectors for some guidance. There are, however, important 
differences between Fedwire and other CI networks. One important difference is that, 
unlike CI networks for water and power, the hubs in Fedwire can and do change daily.  
To formulate effective CIP strategies for the Fedwire network, we can first 
identify the network’s hubs. This is more complex for Fedwire than some other CI 
networks. While at the time of this writing there is no universally agreed upon method for 
distinguishing the probability that a single bank will be critical to the network from day 
to day, we can add to the literature by substantially narrowing down the potential 
candidates. We do this by coupling financial modeling with insights garnered from 
network science and other CI sectors. 
 
                                                
36 These effects were seen following 9/11 and, more recently, at many point during the ongoing “credit 
crisis” that has depressed the world economy and led to the bankruptcy of numerous small and large banks.  
Paper Draft                                                                                                            Lieberman 









Figure 5: Payment Coordination and Risks to Fedwire Operation. Regular payment 






























































a. Regular Payment 
Coordination: Bank A 
has an account balance 
of 100 and waits for a 
200 payment from Bank 
C before sending 200 to 
Bank B. In this case, the 
account balance of Bank 
C is inconsequential. 
b. A Gridlocked 
Network: Each bank 
needs to send 200 but 
only has an account 
balance of 100. This 
cluster can be solved by 
transferring all money 
simultaneously (i.e., 
netting). 
c. A Deadlocked 
Network: Each bank 
needs to send 200 but 
the account balance of 
Bank A is 0. This cluster 
cannot be solved by 
netting alone. Bank A 
must receive 100, then 
the cluster can be solved 
by netting as above.  
Paper Draft                                                                                                            Lieberman 
Draft 2, May 2008 17
The number of transactions a bank engages in can vary widely from day to day, 
but there are a limited number of FSS participants that are likely to be hubs. In their study 
of Fedwire topology, Soramäki et al. found a core component37 of Fedwire that consists 
of the same 2,578 banks every day38. This represents roughly 37% of the complete 
network.  We can further reduce the number of banks that are likely to be hubs in three 
ways. First, we know that the daily hubs have about 2,000 outgoing links while 50% of 
banks in the Fedwire network have fewer than 5 outgoing links. Secondly, we know that 
when banks participate in many transactions they tend to link to banks with only a few 
connections, instead of hubs39 (Figure 6). Lastly, we can look at the historical data 
regarding number of transactions for each bank in the core, keeping in mind the effects of 
periodicity—for instance, a bank that makes a large number of transactions on one day 
may be more or less likely to make a large number of transactions the next day. 
 
Figure 6: Depiction of partial model Fedwire network 
showing relative sizes of banks. Larger size is equivalent 
to a greater number of transactions in Fedwire. 
 
Taken together, these statistics allow us to 
calculate the probability that any single bank will be 
critical on any given day. With the right information, we 
can limit the number of potential hubs to a handful of 
banks. This enables us to concentrate on those banks in 
much the same way that we concentrate on hubs in other 
CIP networks, paying close attention to conditions that 
might put the Fedwire network at increased risk.  
Identifying network hubs, however, is not enough for a sound CIP strategy. The 
reason a ‘protect the hubs’ strategy works for CI/KR networks, in general, is the same 
reason it is necessary but insufficient to constitute a comprehensive strategy for Banking 
and Finance. Hubs must be protected, the reasoning goes, because the greatest number of 
resources (water, electricity, information) will move through them. Hubs will channel the 
commodity throughout the network and without hubs, the network operation will be 
either severely restricted or cease altogether. The commodity in question, however, still 
needs to arrive at a hub in the first place, and continue along its path to where it is needed.  
This problem is particularly germane to the FSS where the coordination of 
payments plays a major role in the clearing and settlement process. Even the hub banks in 
the Fedwire network rely on incoming payments to complete transactions. Banks of all 
sizes coordinate their payments with one another throughout the day to keep their cash 
reserves as low as possible and minimize their exposure to certain types of risk (e.g., 
settlement risk40). What’s more, banks will generally attempt to time all of their 
payments in this way. Thus, if Bank A—a hub in the Fedwire network—send 2,000 
                                                
37 In network theory literature this core component is generally referred to as the “Giant Strongly 
Connected Component”. 
38 Soramäki et al., “Topology of Interbank Payment Flows”. 
39 This is called disassortivity or dissortivity in most network science literature. 
40 Settlement risk refers to the risk that an incoming payment will not come through as planned. 
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payments out, we can expect that Bank A will receive approximately the same number41. 
We must be able to identify the path that money needs to take within Fedwire. For 
instance, the images in Figure 5 depict the path of 200 from Bank A to Bank B to Bank C.  
 
IDENTIFYING CRITICAL PATHS 
 
Another CIP insight that we can glean from investigating network topology is 
what paths are most critical to the functioning of the sector. By analogy, consider the 
water sector. If there is a hub in the water sector that is responsible for pumping and 
distributing clean water to millions of Americans, then it makes sense to protect that hub, 
especially if there is no readily available backup. If that critical element in the water 
infrastructure is fed primarily by a large reservoir then we must consider that reservoir a 
critical element as well, even if it has only a single connection in the network—it’s link 
to the pumping and distribution facility.  
Network hubs will be part of critical paths, in general, regardless of the network 
or CI/KR sector42. Correspondingly, a convergent CIP strategy must also consider the 
ways in which we can best allocate resources to hardening and protecting critical paths in 
networks, and this is illustrated below with regards to Fedwire. Fortunately, the history 
and practice of BCM offers numerous methodologies as well as examples (both 
successful and unsuccessful) of critical path protection43.  
Since incoming payments are used to make outgoing payments across the network 
throughout the day, simply protecting the hubs of the Fedwire network will not protect 
the clearing and settlement process. Protecting hubs will not stop gridlock or deadlock. If 
the Fedwire network becomes gridlocked, outgoing payments become queued as banks 
wait for incoming payments. The longer the gridlock exists, the larger the queues become. 
If a hub bank starts building a queue, it could be detrimental to Fedwire operation. 
Since the hub banks generally make about 2,000 payments per day, a large percentage of 
the Fedwire network will be immediately affected by any delay. Given the connectivity 
of Fedwire, it is likely that the secondary effects—i.e., simultaneous queues at the 2,000 
recipient banks— would affect almost all of the Fedwire network and US financial 
system44. 
Critical paths are those that affect a large part of the network, and it’s clear that 
hubs are generally part of critical paths. However, due to the fact that hub banks tend to 
link to banks with only a few connections, most critical paths in the Fedwire network will 
involve one hub and many banks with few links. A probable scenario leading to wide-
spread gridlock involves a large hub bank waiting on a high-value payment from a 
smaller bank (Figure 7).      
 
                                                
41 This is supported both in theory (e.g., McAndrews and Potter, “Liquidity Effects”) and by empirical 
studies of network transactions (e.g., Soramäki et al., “Topology of Interbank Payment Flows”). 
42 Of course, this is only true in networks that have hubs. Some networks have a more homogenous 
distribution of links. Thus, even though there might be critical paths, there are no network hubs.  
43 See Kenneth Myers, Business Continuity Strategies: Protecting Against Unplanned Disasters (Hoboken, 
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006)  
44 In these situations, banks borrow money from major lending sources such as The Federal Reserve Bank.  
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Figure 7: Critical paths through large and small banks. Larger size is equivalent to greater 
number of transactions in Fedwire. Both the small Bank B and the large Bank A are 
critical to the rest of the network. A problem originating at small Bank B can shut down 
Fedwire operations. (Arrowheads indicate direction of money flow.)  
 
 STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT 
 
Developing a convergent CIP strategy for Banking and Finance requires that we 
address both gridlock and deadlock in the Fedwire network. The “gridlock resolution” 
methods currently proposed in the literature are algorithms that will inspect payment 
queues and identify the largest collection of pending payments that can be settled 
simultaneously without resulting in an overdraft45. The gridlock resolution algorithm is 
effectively an on-demand netting system since each bank affected by the algorithm’s 
implementation will end up with the ending (net) amount as if all of the transactions 
taking place one at a time. In Figure 5, for instance, all banks transfer 200 and end up 
with balances of 100. But gridlock resolution mechanisms cannot address Fedwire 
deadlocks. 
Deadlocks cannot be solved by netting when at least one bank in a payment path 
would end up with an overdraft. To resolve deadlocks, banks must borrow money and a 
major source of this funding is the Federal Reserve Bank, which has historically lent 
money to banks at favorable rates during times of crisis. Like most current practices, such 
lending is reductionist and isolationist in the sense that banks are each considered 
individually and a loan is made if deemed appropriate.  
Enough lending through can theoretically resolve any deadlock, but it comes at an 
enormous price. Such lending increases the delays associated with payment coordination 
across the Fedwire network, costs the US economy in interest payments, and exposes the 
Federal Reserve System to large amounts of credit risk. The FRB is understandably 
                                                
45 See Bech and Soramäki, “Gridlock Resolution”. For a brief review of settlement simulations see, 
Donatas Bakys and Leonidas Sakalauskas, “The System for Simulating Interbank Settlements,” 
Technological and Economic Development of Economy, Volume XIII, no. 4 (2007): 323-332 
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cautious about loaning more money than is needed, and the recovery time from a wide-
scale disruption is inherently extended by these considerations. Problems are further 
exacerbated by the fact that gridlocks and deadlocks are treated separately when they 
could be treated simultaneously by a comprehensive CIP plan the focuses on continuity 
of operations in the financial services.  
The real-time and ongoing identification of network hubs and critical paths can 
allow the Fedwire network to “heal” itself in a way that permits the clearing and 
settlement of all gridlocked and deadlocked payments in the system. Modern networked 
computer systems could make this process transparent, seamless and near-instantaneous. 
Using the tools of network theory, we can identify clusters of payment queues that can be 
settled using gridlock resolution methods. Unlike the existing methods, however, the 
algorithm would not look for the largest set of payments to settle simultaneously. It 
would, rather, look for and settle those clusters of payments that would permit the whole 
network to resume normal operation as quickly as possible.  
Because of the differences in account balances before and after settlement, and 
the process of payment coordination, a path-based gridlock resolution method allows for 
a greater number of settlements to take place between a larger set of banks in a shorter 
period of time. “Solving” one cluster after another means a greater number of payments 
will be completed in a shorter period of time than attempting to solve the largest set of 
payments at once (Figure 8). Addressing payment clusters sequentially can fix system-
wide problems more efficiently than the current gridlock resolution algorithms. 
Path-based gridlock resolution (PBGR) addresses half of the problem. When the 
network is deadlocked, there must be a mechanism for providing the appropriate amount 
of quick liquidity to those banks that need it in order for Fedwire to return to normal 
operations. PBGR can be combined with an efficient liquidity system that would lead to 
the most gridlock resolution and require the least amount of liquidity injection to resolve 
network deadlock. This system can be highly efficient loaning only the minimum amount 
of money needed to enable PBGR by injecting liquidity at specific sites in the Fedwire 
network. The combination of Path-Based Gridlock Resolution (PBGR) and the 
Automatic Local Liquidity Injection for Efficient Settlement (ALLIES) meets all of the 
CIP goals for the Financial Services Sector. For simplicity, we will call the combination 
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a. Largest cluster in a gridlocked network. Existing gridlock resolution methods solve for 
the largest cluster of banks in a gridlocked network at any one time. The existing methods 
might solve a central cluster of banks, but ignore other banks within Fedwire’s critical 
paths (such as Bank S, or Bank O), leading to more government intervention (liquidity 




b. Settlement of three clusters along a critical path. Path-Based Gridlock Resolution 
(PBGR) solves clusters of banks in the order that allows for the greatest number of 
accounts to be settled across the entire Fedwire network. Suppose a critical path exists 
from Bank N  Bank K  Bank E  Bank A. PBGR starts by investigating the 
upstream dependencies from network hub Bank A, dividing the network in to three 
clusters that can be settled one after the other for the most efficient resumption of 
Fedwire trading activity. Settlement of cluster 1 permits Bank N to send payment to Bank 
K, which allows the settlement of cluster 2. Resolution of gridlock in both cluster 1 and 
cluster 2 allows cluster 3 to be settled, which permits settlement of the entire network. 
 
Figure 8: Depictions of existing gridlock resolution methods (a), and Path-Based 
Gridlock Resolution (b).  
Largest Cluster  
  Cluster 3  
Cluster 1  
Cluster 2  
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a. Detail of cluster 1 from Figure 8b. ALLIES resolves deadlock in cluster 1 by injecting 




b. Detail of deadlock from Figure 5c. ALLIES can resolve this deadlock by injecting 100 
at Bank A, then the cluster can be solved by transferring all money simultaneously 
between Banks A, B and C (i.e., netting). Traditional systems result in a loan of 200 to 
Bank A, double the amount necessary to settle payments using ACCS. 
 
Figure 9: Operation of Automatic Local Liquidity Injection for Efficient Settlement 














ALLIES solves deadlocked cluster by injecting 100 at Bank S 
 
     Bal: 0 
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An intelligent system with information about all payment queues and account 
balances in the Fedwire network will be able to identify where the least amount of money 
is needed to resolve local deadlocks between banks. An ACCS system can be designed to 
first look at those banks that are most likely to be Fedwire hubs since these hubs are most 
likely to lie along the critical paths in Fedwire. Investigating the upstream and 
downstream (i.e., incoming and outgoing) paths from hubs will be the quickest way to 
ascertain precisely why money is not flowing through the system as usual, and correct the 
problems.  
 Analyzing these potential critical paths in parallel can quickly elucidate how to 
settle accounts without excess liquidity injection. Our criterion can be total number of 
payments, total value of payments, or some combination, so long at the ACCS system has 
access to information about all pending payments in Fedwire. The system can investigate 
payment clusters within Fedwire, settle clusters of several banks at a time that do not 
require any liquidity injection, and result in the transfer of money to a bank that would 
have otherwise required a loan. Thus, in a large number of cases we may be able to avoid 
deadlock altogether, even during financial disasters such as the credit crisis and the 
aftermath of 9/11.  
 A detailed explanation of ACCS system operation and its implementation is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Further research is needed to determine how a system 
would be deployed, and the precise implementation and deployment of an ACCS system 
will be a matter of policy development (as described in the next section). Nevertheless, 
the technological foundations for ACCS are in place as of this writing. Recent 
publications have paved the way for major developments in the design of “self-healing 
networks” (SHNs)46, 47, and there exist several candidate systems on top of which ACCS 
could be built, including the Secure Financial Transaction Protocol (SFTP) and the 
Resilient Financial Transaction System (RFTS) design48. As outlined in the Banking and 
Finance SSP, research and development activities regarding these systems is an ongoing 
priority, with the number one R&D priority being the development and deployment of 
“protection and prevention systems” in the Banking and Finance sector49. 
 
 POLICY IMPLIMENTATION 
 
 Now that we have outlined the foundations of a strategy to reach our CIP goals, 
we consider the fundamentals of implementing a policy based on our strategy of 
addressing CIP at the operational level. Namely, we must outline an actionable policy for 
                                                
46 See Abdullah Gani and G. Manson, “Towards a Self-Healing Network in Controlling Access to Network 
Applications,” Informing Science (June 2003) 
proceedings.informingscience.org/IS2003Proceedings/docs/063Gani.pdf accessed 10 March 2008.  
47 See Thara Angskun, Graham E. Fagg, George Bosilca, Jelena Pjeˇsivac–Grbovi´c, and Jack J. Dongarra, 
“Self-Healing Network for Scalable Fault Tolerant Runtime Environments” (University of Tennessee, 
Knoxville Publication) www.open-mpi.org/papers/dapsys-2006-self-healing-network/dapsys-2006-self-
healing-network.pdf accessed 12 March 2008.  
48 For an extensive review of payment and settlement simulations, see Harry Leinonen (ed.), Liquidity, risks 
and speed in payment and settlement systems—a simulation approach (Bank of Finland, 2005), available 
online at www.bof.fi/NR/rdonlyres/26D6CF7C-9927-4330-B412-BACDBF50BAAD/0/E31.pdf accessed 
20 March 2008.  
49 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Banking and Finance,” 4.  
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implementing an ACCS system to prevent and respond to gridlock and deadlock in 
Fedwire. The BCM literature emphasizes that the proper identification of stakeholders is 
central to the development of any successful plan. Identifying stakeholders guides policy 
in the same way that identifying operational components guides strategy.   
 There are several groups of stakeholders regarding the Fedwire network. Firstly, 
there are the FSS participants, mostly large banks, which make up the nodes of the 
network. Since this is a very vocal and prominent group, it may be tempting to stop here, 
and work out policies designed to bolster the security of just this group of stakeholders. 
In fact, this is what current policy does in many ways, giving banks access to large 
amounts of liquidity and publicly-funded human resources. Addressing only this group of 
stakeholders, however, does not produce a comprehensive CIP policy. 
 When an organization develops a BCM policy, it may first consider its employees 
and contractors. They are, after all, centrally important to operations. But the chief goal 
of a policy is to enable the continuity of business operations during a crisis. The 
organization considers its suppliers and customers, implementing policy to ensure the 
delivery of goods or services during and after a disaster. These upstream (suppliers) and 
downstream (customers) elements are essential stakeholder groups. The Banking and 
Finance CI sector has corresponding stakeholder groups that exist outside of the Fedwire 
network itself.  
Individuals and institutions supply the Fedwire network with the money it uses for 
daily operations. Individual and institutional “suppliers” provide the money that Fedwire 
banks transfer. Likewise, individual and institutional “customers” borrow and receive 
money from Fedwire participants. The daily operations of Fedwire are essentially the 
movement of money between the accounts of these suppliers and customers. Thus, while 
the current FSS practices protect the FSS participants through the availability of loans, 
they do not provide security to the suppliers and customers of the Fedwire network.  
But there is another stakeholder, too, that is at least as important in terms of crisis 
management and CIP. During a financial crisis, the United States government and 
American public suffers in two major ways. Transactions through financial networks 
provide revenue to the US and state governments. Capital gains taxes, transactions 
charges, sales taxes and other various forms of taxation on financial operations provide 
an important source of public funds50. When the Fedwire network is not operating 
effectively, local, state and federal revenues suffer. This is especially true when there is 
longer term deadlock or heavy gridlock in the Fedwire network that prevents innumerable 
taxable transactions from being completed. While it may be impossible to ever precisely 
gauge the total economic impact of the attacks of 9/1151, it is certainly in the many 
hundreds of billions of dollars52.  
                                                
50 Gerald Auten, “Capital Gains Taxation”, in Encyclopedia of Taxation and Tax Policy Project, eds. 
Joseph J. Cordes, Robert D. Ebel, and Jane G. Gravelle, available online at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000519.pdf accessed 10 March 2008.  
51 For a review, see Robert Looney, “Economic Costs to the United States Stemming from the 9/11 
Attacks,” Strategic Insights, Volume 1, Issue 6, August 2002 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/aug02/homeland.pdf accessed 9 March 2008.  
52 The insurance claim alone was close to $21 billion according to statistics provided by the reinsurance 
company Swiss Re at http://www.swissre.com/INTERNET/pwsfilpr.nsf/vwFilebyIDKEYLu/SROS-
6MQD65/$FILE/F_2005.pdf accessed March 9 2008.  
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During a financial crisis, the public is also impacted by government-sponsored 
bailouts that use tax revenues to redress operational problems in the financial services. 
The financial history of the United States has seen the federal government dedicate 
hundreds of millions of dollars of tax revenue to provide liquidity to FSS participants. 
While these bailouts have been for the most part effective at restoring the banking and 
finance system, they are very costly. Most economists agree that bailouts are inefficient 
and that diverting public funds during financial crises can hurt important civic initiatives 
such as healthcare and education53.  
An effective CIP policy should take in to account all of these stakeholder groups 
and focus also on minimizing the impact on the American public during times of crisis. 
The Banking and Finance CIP policies in place are concentrated on supporting one 
stakeholder group, large banks, to the detriment of the overall US financial system and 
economy. This destructive focus is illustrated in the operation of current gridlock 
resolution systems. FSS participants give priority to some payments over others, with the 
goal of settling “higher priority” payments first. The gridlock resolution mechanisms in 
place today will not settle a group of payments unless these priorities can be satisfied for 
all banks in the settlement cluster54. In general, this results in many fewer settlements, 
increased delay and a propensity for network gridlock. 
Respecting the preferences of banks to settle payments in a specific order is 
significant to the daily operations of clearing and settlement networks. But during a crisis, 
deferring to these preferences may make the difference between continuing disaster and a 
quick resolution. Binding settlement to payment preferences during a crisis upholds the 
interests of one stakeholder group (private sector FSS participants) while severely 
disadvantaging the interests of the others (including the federal and states governments, 
and American public as a whole).  
In general, there will be situations where focus must be shifted during times of 
crisis from one stakeholder group to another. This is a key feature of effective BCM. 
Businesses will often temporarily inconvenience employees in order to maintain a high 
level of operation to customers during a crisis. In organizations with well articulated 
business continuity plans, employees know that putting up with temporary 
inconveniences (for instance, putting in longer hours) benefits them in the long run 
because it enables the business to maintain operations. These organizations use a specific 
set of criteria to determine if and when a business continuity plan will be “activated”, 
giving a clear signal as to when more focus might be shifted to customers and suppliers.  
A convergent CIP policy in the Banking and Finance sector can also provide clear 
criteria as to when continuity activities will begin, and a well articulated set of activities 
that will be undertaken to achieve the continuity goals. While the specifics of a 
convergent CIP policy in the FSS must be developed in conjunction with experienced 
regulators and financial economists, we can outline the foundations of two broad policy 
options here. 
 The first option provides for both path based gridlock resolution (PBGR) and 
automated liquidity injection from FRB on-demand. Fedwire would operate without the 
Automatic Cascading Cluster Settlement (ACCS) until an emergency is declared. This 
                                                
53 For an extensive review, see Benton E. Gup (ed.), Too Big to Fail: Policies and Practices in Government 
Bailouts (Praeger Publishers, 2003).  
54 Bech and Soramäki, “Gridlock Resolution”.  
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allows FSS participants to keep all discretion with regards to payment priorities and 
taking loans during normal operations (i.e., non-crisis periods). When an emergency is 
declared, ACCS is activated and remains activated until the emergency is declared over, 
at which time normal operations are resumed. The first option provides structured 
response activities, but no preparation over what is currently in practice. Thus it is 
questionable whether this option meets the goals outlined above. 
 The second policy option meets both convergent CIP goals of effective 
preparation and efficient response by providing PBGR at all times. Implementing PBGR 
during normal operations will drastically reduce the probability of a network gridlock and 
deadlock. It does so, however, by executing sequences of transactions that are efficient 
for the entire CI/KR sector, and not necessarily the preferences of individual 
participants55.  When an emergency is declared, the automated liquidity system is 
activated on top of PBGR to prevent deadlocks, and it deactivated when the emergency is 
declared over. This option keeps the operation of all loan activities as they currently are 
during non-crisis times, allowing banks maximum flexibility during daily operations, and 
adds an emergency-only liquidity mechanism that quickly and effectively prevents 
financial disasters from spreading. 
 The criteria used to declare an emergency will depend on which option is pursued. 
ACCS will have to be activated more quickly to mitigate a crisis under the first policy 
option, since there is no intrinsic protection against gridlock. This makes option two a 
much safer choice for the Banking and Finance sector than option one. Under option two, 
the underlying CI network is protected against gridlock and deadlock. Still, it is debatable 
whether full implementation of an ACCS system during normal operations is a feasible 
policy option.  
 The legal and regulatory framework for an automated liquidity system will also 
depend greatly on what type of policy is pursued. A deciding factor will be the 
willingness of large banks to participate in the system. Even as the network-wide benefits 
are clear, it would temporarily inconvenience some FSS participants. The extent of this 
inconvenience, however, must be weighed against the inconveniences and large-scale 
problems faced during a financial crisis.  
There are three strong and simple arguments that CIP practitioners can make for 
participation in the automated liquidity system: 1) Involvement in a solid and effective 
CIP policy will be factored in to the financial markets, reducing perceived volatility. This 
will reduce the price of money since an effective CIP policy does actually increase the 
stability of US financial markets. 2) The Federal Reserve will be able to lend money 
using ALLIES at deeply discounted rates over current lending. In an ACCS system, the 
minimum amount of money is spent to resolve network deadlocks, this substantially 
reduces risks for the FRB and saves money for FSS participants. 3) An ACCS system 
inherently shortens the length of financial crises by implementing the most efficient 
course back to normal operation, saving money and reducing risks for all groups of 
stakeholders by addressing the entire Banking and Finance sector holistically.     
 
                                                
55 While it would be possible to design a path-based gridlock resolution system that recognizes payment 
priorities, more research is needed to determine is such a system would present a substantial benefit over 
the gridlock resolution systems currently in place. The benefit derived from such a system would be largely 
dependent on other CIP and FSS operational policies in place.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The lack of a framework for holistically evaluating critical infrastructure sectors 
has been a major obstacle to the security community reaching consensus regarding 
metrics and tools in critical infrastructure protection. While many tools exist for 
evaluating and comparing single pieces of infrastructure, these tools do not effectively 
address sector-wide issues at the level of implementation. Traditional reductionist and 
isolationist methods produce conflict by leading to strategies that many practitioners feel 
wrongly prioritize some CI elements over others. This is particularly true for CI sectors 
where the operational elements are less visible, like Banking and Finance. 
Recent publications have demonstrated a convergence in thinking and research 
between critical infrastructure protection and business continuity in the financial services. 
Both financial economists and security researchers have started emphasizing that 
continuity of operations should be the fundamental goal of CIP in the Banking and 
Finance, and that the United States clearing and settlement network, Fedwire, should be 
the focal point of CIP efforts. Here we propose a convergent CIP framework that 
incorporates principles and methodologies from the area of business continuity 
management and draws upon current research from the field of network science to design 
a system of metrics and tools that provides CIP practitioners with a common risk 
management structure and language.  
We apply this convergent framework to the Banking and Finance sector in the 
form of an intelligent continuity system that works on top of Fedwire. This system meets 
the goals of the Banking and Finance Sector-Specific Plan, as well as the goals set forth 
in business continuity literature regarding the financial services by: 1) maintaining a 
funds transfer network that intrinsically minimizes the probability that clearing and 
settlement activities will be negatively impacted by outside events, and 2) designing a 
funds transfer network that quickly and effectively restores clearing and settlement 
activities between appropriate parties during and after a disaster.  
An Automatic Cascading Cluster Settlement (ACCS) system can simultaneously 
address both of the system-wide risks to Fedwire and the US economy identified by 
financial economists. Gridlock is addressed by an on-demand netting system using Path-
Based Gridlock Resolution (PBGR) that investigates payment queues and payment paths 
in Fedwire. The PBGR algorithm scans the entire network for critical paths and 
determines the appropriate sequence of payment clusters to solve that allow the greatest 
percentage of the Fedwire network (i.e., the greatest number of Fedwire participants) to 
return to normal operation as quickly as possible. PBGR will simultaneously transfer the 
net amount between all banks in the gridlocked cluster whenever possible, solving one 
cluster after another unless there is a liquidity shortage, or deadlock. The complement to 
PBGR, an automated liquidity system, solves network deadlocks intelligently alongside 
PBGR. When ACCS comes across a cluster that cannot be solved by PBGR alone (i.e., 
netting would result in an overdraft), it identifies the FSS participant where the minimum 
amount of money must be added to solve the deadlock and any resulting gridlocks, adds 
this amount to the appropriate account at the FRB and continues the PBGR process.  
A convergent strategy provides the security and defense community with a 
common language and framework, allowing researchers and practitioners from all areas 
to reach consensus regarding tools and metrics in critical infrastructure protection. 
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Research in network science, and the extensive literature surrounding business continuity 
management and continuity of operations, provides a sound and serviceable body of 
security principles that allow for critical infrastructure protection strategy to be developed 
and implemented holistically, for entire CI sectors. Conceptualizing sectors as complete 
entities instead of groups of individual elements allows us to move past the patchwork of 
strategies and regulations that have become the defining feature of critical infrastructure 
protection, and develop effective and comprehensive policies for the modern networked 
infrastructure systems that support the country and connect the world.   
